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Life after Vu: Manner of Computer
Searches and Search Protocols
Gerald Chan*

I. INTRODUCTION
Computers have been an indispensable part of our lives for at least
two decades. Given the extent of our dependency on computers and the
vast amounts of information that they contain, it was inevitable that they
would become the focal point of criminal investigations. The only
surprise is that it took so long for search and seizure law to join the party.
Having repeatedly granted leave and issued sweeping judgments in this
area in the past few years, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to be
making up for lost time.
Police searches and seizures are primarily regulated by section 8 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 8 guarantees
everyone the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure, 1
and its purpose is to protect privacy.2 To be considered reasonable, a
search or seizure must: (i) be authorized by a law; (ii) that law must itself
be reasonable; and (iii) the search or seizure must be carried out in a

*
Partner at Ruby Shiller Chan Hasan, Barristers. The author wishes to thank Nader
R. Hasan, with whom he has been co-counsel on a number of digital search and seizure cases and
co-author of a number of papers on the same subject. The author’s professional collaborations with
Mr. Hasan have made an invaluable contribution to much of his own thinking in this challenging
area of the law. The author also wishes to thank his law student, Jenn Aubrey, for her helpful
feedback on an earlier draft of this paper.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
Hunter v. Southam Inc. (sub nom. Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of
Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.), [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”]. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court left
open the possibility that the purpose of section 8 of the Charter is broader: “I would be wary of
foreclosing the possibility that the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure must
protect interests beyond the right of privacy, but for the purposes of the present appeal I am satisfied
that its protections go at least that far.”
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reasonable manner.3 The first two requirements can be further specified
with reference to the Supreme Court’s holding in Hunter v. Southam,
which imposed a presumptive requirement that the search or seizure be
pre-authorized by an impartial arbiter on the basis of reasonable and
probable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
search or seizure will reveal evidence of that crime.4 Searches or seizures
that do not satisfy this requirement of prior authorization are prima facie
unreasonable.
Therefore, section 8 of the Charter will in most cases achieve its
purpose of protecting privacy by imposing two prophylactic rules. First,
the police must obtain prior authorization for the search or seizure, which
will typically be in the form of a search warrant.5 Second, even where a
warrant has been issued, the search must be conducted in a reasonable
manner.6 The first rule prevents unjustified intrusions while the second
rule regulates the extent of the intrusion.7
In three important cases, the Supreme Court of Canada applied these
long-established, general principles of section 8 of the Charter to the
digital world of computer searches. In R. v. Morelli, the Court wrote, that
“[i]t is difficult to imagine a search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive
of one’s privacy than the search and seizure of a personal computer”; and
it is therefore important for the police to ensure that they have laid a
proper basis for any warrant authorizing such a search.8 Two years later
in R. v. Cole, the Court held that the same principles apply to work
computers, “at least where personal use is permitted or reasonably
expected”; and the police must therefore obtain a warrant before
searching the contents of such computers.9 Just last year in Vu, the Court
held that a warrant may only be relied on to search the contents of a
3

R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Collins”].
4

Hunter v. Southam, supra, note 2, at 160.
Id., at 160. There are exceptions to the requirement of prior authorization. For instance,
the police may conduct a search of a person and his or her immediate surroundings incident to a
lawful arrest: R. v. Caslake, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at para. 15 (S.C.C.). Whether
and to what extent this exception applies to digital devices such as computers and cell phones will be
determined by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Fearon, [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 141 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Fearon”]. The case was heard on May 23, 2014 and is currently under reserve. The
author was co-counsel to the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association in this case along with his
partner, Nader R. Hasan.
6
Collins, supra, note 3, at 278.
7
R. v. Vu, [2013] S.C.J. No. 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vu”].
8
[2010] S.C.J. No. 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at paras. 2-4 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morelli”].
9
[2012] S.C.J. No. 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, at para. 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cole”].
5

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

COMPUTER SEARCHES AND SEARCH PROTOCOLS

435

computer where it specifically authorizes a computer search; a warrant
that only authorizes the search of a residence in which a computer
happens to be found is inadequate.10
These three cases provide useful guidance on the constitutional
regulation of computer searches under section 8 of the Charter. Each of
them, however, is concerned mainly with the first prophylactic rule
requiring prior judicial authorization. This is, in many ways, the easier of
the two rules. The question of whether and how the police should be
required to obtain a warrant is relatively simple because it does not
engage new processes. The police must decide whether the search of a
particular computer (personal or work) engages a reasonable expectation
of privacy; if it does, then the police must obtain a warrant before
searching it. In order to do so, the investigating officer must swear an
Information to Obtain setting out reasonable grounds to believe that a
search of the computer will afford evidence of crime. The processes
leading up to the obtaining of a warrant to search a computer are largely
the same as they are for warrants to search other places and receptacles
(e.g., a house or car).
The second prophylactic rule governing the manner of search raises
thornier problems when applied in the digital world. After decades of
manner of search litigation, certain rules have emerged to govern
searches and seizures in the physical world: for example, the police must
ordinarily give notice before forcing entry; the police may use reasonable
force to gain entry; and upon entry, the police are entitled to control the
premises to ensure their safety and prevent the destruction of evidence.
None of these rules, however, maps over easily to the digital world.
There, the execution of a search warrant raises novel questions:
(1) Once the police have obtained a warrant to search a computer, can
they look through every single file and folder in the computer?
(2) Are they limited to reviewing certain types of files?
(3) Should they be restricted to searching by certain keywords?
(4) What happens if they stumble upon evidence of one crime (e.g.,
images of child pornography) in the course of searching for evidence
of another crime (e.g., documentation of fraud)?

10

Vu, supra, note 7, at para. 3.
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The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet had to grapple directly with
any of these questions. But there is no doubt that these issues represent the
next frontier of computer search and seizure law. In Vu, the Court invited
counsel to engage in vigorous manner of search litigation in the computer
context by emphasizing that a warrant to search a device does not give the
police “a licence to scour the devic[e] indiscriminately”.11 Instead, if the
police, in the course of their search, realize that there is no reason to search
a particular program or file, the law of search and seizure would require
them not to do so.12 Moreover, the Court noted that while manner of search
is generally reviewed after the fact,13 issuing justices may find it
“necessary and practical” to impose search protocols (i.e., ex ante
conditions) in certain cases.14
This paper seeks to build on these statements and imagine the postVu world of computer search and seizure law. Section 1 of Part II will
summarize Vu and the propositions for which it stands. Section 2 will
take up Vu’s invitation to carefully examine the manner of computer
searches and draw on lower court decisions (in both Canada and the
United States) in an attempt to tease out some general principles. Section 3
will analyze the issue of search protocols and when it might be
appropriate — and, indeed, constitutionally required — for authorizing
justices to impose ex ante conditions to regulate the manner of computer
searches. The paper will conclude by urging the courts to adopt three
general propositions to control the scope of computer searches so that
they do not render the warrant requirement meaningless:
(1) The courts should carefully examine the methodology used by the
police to determine whether they were faithful to the objectives of
the warrant in their execution of the search.
(2) The courts should resist categorical claims that every file on a computer
must be examined, even if only cursorily, to determine its relevance.
(3) The courts should require search protocols to be set out in the
warrant in cases involving heightened privacy risks (e.g., searches
involving potentially privileged information and confidential
intellectual property; searches aimed at networks of computers; and
searches targeting innocent parties).
11
12
13
14

Id., at para. 61.
Id.
Id., at para. 55.
Id., at para. 62.
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II. BEYOND A WARRANT REQUIREMENT:
WHERE DO WE GO FROM VU?
1. Vu: What Did the Court Hold?
In Vu, the police obtained a warrant authorizing the search of a
residence for evidence of theft of electricity, including documentation
identifying the owners and/or occupants of the residence. The warrant
authorized the police to seize, among other things “documentation
identifying ownership and/or occupancy of the property” relevant to an
investigation of the offence.15 It did not, however, specifically authorize
the search or seizure of any computers or cell phones.
The police executed this warrant and discovered two computers and
a cell phone in the residence. They searched these devices, and these
searches led to evidence that Mr. Vu was the occupant of the residence.16
At trial, Mr. Vu claimed that these searches violated his rights under
section 8 of the Charter and asked the judge to exclude the evidence. The
trial judge found that police were not authorized to search the computers
and cell phone because those devices were not specifically mentioned in
the warrant. The trial judge excluded most of the evidence found as a
result of these searches and acquitted the accused.17
The British Columbia Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal
and ordered a new trial. It held that a computer is no different from “a
four-drawer filing cabinet” when it comes to search and seizure law.18
The general rule, with respect to physical objects, is that a warrant
authorizing a search of a specific location for specific things authorizes
the executing officers to conduct a reasonable examination of anything at
that location within which the specified things might be found. “Just as it
cannot be said that a warrant to search for documentary evidence relating
to a fraudulent scheme would not apply to a four-drawer filing cabinet,
the existence of which the police learn of after entering a residence,” the
Court of Appeal wrote, “neither can it be said that such a warrant would
not apply to a computer, the existence of which the police learn of after
entering a residence.”19
15
16
17
18
19

Id., at para. 12.
Id., at para. 4.
R. v. Vu, [2010] B.C.J. No. 1777, at paras. 60-69 (B.C.S.C.).
R. v. Vu, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2487, at para. 63 (B.C.C.A.).
Id., at para. 63.
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The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed. In a unanimous judgment
written by Cromwell J., the Court rejected the notion that a computer was
no different from a physical container. “Computers differ in important
ways from the receptacles governed by the traditional framework,”
Cromwell J. wrote, “and computer searches give rise to particular
privacy concerns that are not sufficiently addressed by that approach.”20
Because computers raise unique privacy concerns, specific prior
authorization must be obtained in order for a computer search to comply
with section 8 of the Charter.
The Court delineated four important ways in which computers are
different.
First, computers can “store immense amounts of information, some
of which, in the case of personal computers, will touch the ‘biographical
core of personal information’”.21 An 80-gigabyte desktop drive — and
commercial hard drives have far greater capacities — can store the
equivalent of 40 million pages of text. Therefore, as the Ontario Court of
Appeal put it in R. v. Mohamad, a computer “can be a repository for an
almost unlimited universe of information”.22 This information touches on
the most intimate aspects of our private lives.23
Second, a computer is, as Alan D. Gold has put it, a “fastidious
record keeper”.24 Computers contain information that is automatically
generated, often without the user knowing. Most web browsers, for
instance, are programmed to automatically retain information about the
websites that a user has visited in recent weeks in order to help the user
retrace his or her cybernetic steps. This information can also, however,
enable investigators to “access intimate details about a user’s interests,
habits, and identity, drawing on a record that the user has created
unwittingly”.25
Third, a computer retains files and data even after users think they
have destroyed them.26 When a user marks a file as deleted, the operating

20

Vu, supra, note 7, at para. 2.
Id., at para. 41.
22
[2004] O.J. No. 279, 69 O.R. (3d) 481, at para. 43 (Ont. C.A.), cited in Vu, id., at para. 41.
23
Orin Kerr, “Searches and Seizures in a Digital World (2005) 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531, at
569 [hereinafter “Kerr”]. See also R. v. Morelli, supra, note 8, at paras. 3, 105; R. v. Cole, supra,
note 9, at para. 47; R. v. Jones, [2011] O.J. No. 4388, at para. 37 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Jones”].
24
Alan D. Gold, “Applying Section 8 in the Digital World: Seizures and Searches”,
prepared for the 7th Annual Six-Minute Criminal Defence Lawyer (June 9, 2007), at para. 3.
25
Vu, supra, note 7, at para. 42.
26
Id., at para. 43.
21
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system simply goes to the “Master File Table” and marks that particular
file’s clusters available for future use by other files. If the operating
system does not reuse that cluster for another file by the time the
computer is analyzed, the file marked for deletion will still be available
for examination. Even if another file has been assigned to that cluster, a
large amount of data can be recovered from the computer’s “slack
space”, i.e., space within the cluster left temporarily unused.27 In this
way, the computer’s “delete” key is more aptly described as a “hide” key.
Every inappropriate image, file or e-mail the user has ever viewed
(even accidentally) will likely reside somewhere on the computer for
years and be subject to examination by investigators no matter how
quickly it was deleted.
Fourth, computers are rarely stand-alone, self-contained entities.
When connected to the Internet, computers serve as “portals to an almost
infinite amount of information that is shared between different users and
is stored almost anywhere in the world”.28 Similarly, computers can be
connected to networks or servers which link them to other computers.29
This is often the case with computers found in a workplace. Consider, for
instance, the single rogue trader in a multi-national financial firm who is
suspected of engaging in insider trading from his workplace computer.
A police officer with access to that employee’s computer would be able
to access the company’s entire network, which might span five
continents and contain the private files of hundreds of employees as well
as sensitive information about the firm’s clients.
These “numerous and striking differences” between computers and
traditional receptacles, the Court held, call for “distinctive treatment
under s. 8 of the Charter”.30 It is not enough for a warrant to authorize
the search of a place in which a computer is found; the warrant must
specifically authorize the search of a computer within that place. Only
then, the Court held, can one be sure that “the authorizing justice has
considered the full range of the distinctive privacy concerns raised by
computer searches and, having done so, has decided that this threshold
has been reached in the circumstances of a particular proposed search”.31

27
28
29
30
31

Id., at para. 43, citing Kerr, supra, note 23, at 542.
Vu., id., at para. 44.
Id.
Id., at para. 45.
Id., at para. 47.
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The Court then went further and addressed a specific submission
made by the intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (the
“BCCLA”).32 The BCCLA had argued that it was not enough for a search
warrant to simply include the word “computer”; rather, the unique
privacy concerns raised by computers require police officers to submit,
and justices to authorize, search protocols (i.e., ex ante conditions) in
advance of the search. These protocols would limit the scope of the
computer search in order to ensure that, as much as possible, only that
information which the police have reasonable grounds to search is in fact
revealed.33
The Court did not accept this argument in its entirety, i.e., it held that
search protocols will not be constitutionally required in every case.34
The manner of search, the Court held, is generally to be reviewed after
the fact.35 If the target of the search believes that police have exceeded
the bounds of reasonableness in executing a search warrant on her
computer, she may bring an application to seek Charter relief — and the
reasonableness of the manner of search will then be determined on
ex post review. Detailed rules governing the scope of the search generally
do not need to be proposed by the police and spelled out in the warrant in
advance of the search.
Importantly, however, the Court emphasized that the manner of search
will be closely scrutinized on ex post review. Justice Cromwell wrote:
By now it should be clear that my finding that a search protocol was
not constitutionally required in this case does not mean that once police
had the warrant in hand, they had a licence to scour the devices
indiscriminately. They were bound, in their search, to adhere to the rule
that the manner of search must be reasonable. Thus, if, in the course of
their search, the officers realized that there was in fact no reason to
search a particular program or file on the device, the law of search and
seizure would require them not to do so.36

Moreover, the Court left the door open for search protocols to be
imposed in certain cases. The Court noted that as the case law develops,
“after-the-fact review may lead courts to set out specific rules according

32
33
34
35
36

The author was co-counsel to the BCCLA in this case along with his partner, Nader R. Hasan.
Vu, supra, note 7, at para. 53.
Id., at para. 54.
Id., at para. 55.
Id., at para. 61.
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to which searches must be conducted”, which can then be imported into
search protocols.37 In particular, the Court wrote that issuing justices may
find it “necessary and practical” to impose search protocols in cases
involving “confidential intellectual property or potentially privileged
information”.38 In these cases, protocols could be imposed when police
first request authorization to search the computer. Alternatively, issuing
justices may prefer a “two-stage approach” where they would first issue
a warrant authorizing the seizure of the computer and then have police
return for an additional authorization to search the seized device, which
would include a protocol that would limit the scope of the search.39
Finally, the Court made it clear that it was not “foreclos[ing] the
possibility that our developing understanding of computer searches and
changes in technology may make it appropriate to impose search
protocols in a broader range of cases in the future”.40
2. Manner of Search: How Will This Be Regulated?
The immediate lesson from Vu is that police officers must obtain a
computer-specific warrant before searching the contents of any
computers. But what does this mean beyond inserting the word
“computer” in the warrant? The police must establish reasonable grounds
to believe that a search of the computer will afford evidence of an
offence before they can obtain a computer-specific warrant, but this will
not be difficult to do in most cases. Given the ubiquity of computers and
the immense amount and variety of information that they typically
contain, the police should not have a hard time explaining why a
computer will afford evidence of crime — especially if they already have
reasonable grounds to believe that the place in which the computer is
located contains evidence of crime.41
Beyond establishing the requisite grounds to search a computer and
obtaining a warrant to do so, Vu makes it clear that most of the heavy
lifting will be done on ex post review when the target challenges the

37

Id., at para. 55.
Id., at para. 62.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Lily Robinton, “Courting Chaos: Conflicting Guidance from Courts Highlights the Need
for Clearer Rules to Govern the Search and Seizure of Digital Evidence” (2010) 12 Yale J.L. & Tech
311, at 321 [hereinafter “Robinton”].
38
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execution of the warrant under section 8 of the Charter. Only then will the
manner in which the police searched the computer — e.g., the number of
files they looked at, when they looked at them and for how long — be
measured against the standard for reasonableness under section 8.
In the physical world context, litigation over the manner of search
has generated several rules for the police to follow. Before forcing
entry, the police must ordinarily give: (i) notice of presence, by
knocking or ringing the doorbell; (ii) notice of authority, by identifying
themselves as law enforcement; and (iii) notice of purpose, by stating a
lawful reason for entry.42 The police may use reasonable force to gain
entry.43 Upon entry, the police are entitled to “control the premises” to
ensure their safety and prevent the destruction of evidence. 44 Beyond
controlling the premises, the police are not entitled to detain individuals
simply because they happen to be found at the premises being searched,
nor are they entitled to search their persons without some independent
legal authority.45
These rules provide useful guidance for police officers and valuable
protections for the privacy rights of individuals by, as much as possible,
establishing bright lines beyond which the police must not go. The
project of defining similar rules in the context of computer searches,
however, is only beginning. Computers are different from ordinary
places and receptacles and require a distinctive set of protections.
Because of the four distinctive traits of computers explained in Vu,
computer searches raise two unique challenges for manner of search
regulation.
First, data are intermingled. Even where there are reasonable grounds
to believe that a computer contains evidence of crime, there is a strong
likelihood that the computer contains an “intermingling” of that evidence
with intensely personal information that the police have no reasonable
grounds to search or seize.46 The same computer (or even the same folder
42
R. v. Cornell, [2010] S.C.J. No. 31, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 142, at para. 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Cornell”].
43
R. v. Genest, [1989] S.C.J. No. 5, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.); R. v. Gimson, [1991]
S.C.J. No. 104, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 692 (S.C.C.).
44
R. v. Silveira, [1995] S.C.J. No. 38, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 (S.C.C.); R. v. Strachan, [1988]
S.C.J. No. 94, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.); R. v. Learning, [2010] O.J. No. 3092, at paras. 75-76
(Ont. S.C.J.).
45
Laporte v. Laganière J.S.P., [1972] Q.J. No. 3518, 29 D.L.R. (3d) 351 (Que. S.C.);
R. v. Thompson, [1996] O.J. No. 1501 (Ont. Prov. Div.).
46
See, e.g., Cole, supra, note 9, at para. 88 (illegal photographs intermingled with
photographs of the accused’s wife); In the Matter of the Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F.
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within the computer) which contains fraudulent business records may
also contain intimate medical records.
Second, the ordinary search and seizure process is inverted. In the
physical world, physical realities limit the scope of the search. If, for
example, the warrant authorizes the search and seizure of rifles, the
police cannot reasonably search in a jewelry box. Computers, however,
invert the process; the normal process of “search” and then selective
“seizure” is turned on its head. Because of the difficulties of conducting
an on-site search of computers, the police frequently seize computers
without any prior review of their contents.47 Police then take a mirror
image of the entire hard drive so that they can search through its
contents.48 As a result, over-seizure is a particularly acute problem.49
Computer searches involve “seiz[ing] the haystack to look for the
needle”.50
In light of these difficulties, how should the manner of a computer
search be governed in order to strike the right balance between the
interests of law enforcement and the privacy rights of individuals? While
the jurisprudence is still in its infancy, some broad principles can be
extracted from the lower court decisions in both the pre- and post-Vu
eras; and some general observations can be made.
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Jones is an important
starting point. In that case, the police obtained a warrant to search the
accused’s home and computers for evidence of fraud. In the course of
the computer search, the police discovered images of child pornography.
The reviewing officer then conducted a full search of the hard drive,

Supp.2d 953, at 958 (N.D. Ill. 2004) [hereinafter “West End”]; United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d
1127, at 1132 (10th Cir. 2009).
47
West End, id., at 958.
48
Cole, supra, note 9, at para. 5; R. v. Little, [2009] O.J. No. 3278, at para. 137 (Ont. S.C.J.)
[hereinafter “Little”]; Kerr, supra, note 23, at 541. This has generally been found to be reasonable,
although the courts have been careful not to foreclose the possibility that this technique may be
unreasonable in a given case: Little, id., at para. 164. See also See Christina M. Schuck, “A Search
for the Caselaw to Support the Computer Search Guidance in United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing” (2012) 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 741, at 771 [hereinafter “Schuck”]. In R. v. Cross, [2007]
O.J. No. 5384, at paras. 21-24 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Court held that imaging the hard drive was
unreasonable because the warrant only authorized the police to search the computer for information
concerning one e-mail. Similarly, in R. v. Beitel, [2011] O.J. No. 4331, at para. 29 (Ont. S.C.J.)
[hereinafter “Beitel”], the Court held that imaging the hard drive was unreasonable because the
computer contained sensitive and highly confidential information, such as the patient records of a
psychiatrist.
49
Jones, supra, note 23, at para. 68.
50
United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, at 975 (9th Cir. 2006).
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including a search of video files that the officer would not have
examined for the purposes of the fraud investigation.51 The Court of
Appeal held that this went beyond the scope of the warrant.
Writing for a unanimous panel, Blair J.A. dismissed the Crown’s
argument that a computer is an indivisible object that, once lawfully seized
pursuant to a warrant, can be subject to a full examination of all data stored
therein.52 Instead, Blair J.A. adopted an objective-based approach for
examining the manner of computer searches. “A computer search pursuant
to a warrant,” Blair J.A. wrote, “must be related to the legitimate targets
respecting which the police have established reasonable and probable
grounds, as articulated in the warrant.”53 That is, the reasonableness of the
search depends on whether the police are confining themselves to the
objective of the warrant, which in this case was to authorize a search for
evidence of fraud (and not child pornography).
This approach can be contrasted with a methodology-based
approach, in which the reasonableness of the search depends on whether
the police are confining themselves to specific methods of searching a
computer (e.g., keyword searches, searching only document files and not
videos, etc.). 54 Justice Blair rejected this approach as impractical:
The focus on the type of evidence being sought, as opposed to the type
of files that may be examined, is helpful, it seems to me, particularly in
cases where it may be necessary for the police to do a wide-ranging
inspection of the contents of the computer in order to ensure that
evidence has not been concealed or its resting place in the bowels of the
computer cleverly camouflaged.55

Justice Blair also considered the plain view doctrine and how it
might apply in the computer search context. The plain view doctrine
operates as an exception to the rule against warrantless seizures by
allowing the police to seize evidence that falls outside the parameters of a
warrant where: (i) the police are lawfully in the place where a search is being
conducted; (ii) the incriminating nature of the evidence is immediately
apparent; (iii) the evidence was discovered inadvertently; and (iv) no further

51

Jones, supra, note 23, at paras. 8-11, 23-24.
Id., at paras. 45-46.
53
Id., at para. 42.
54
See Stephen Guzzi, “Digital Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Interplay
Between the Plain View Doctrine and Search-Protocol Warrant Restrictions” (2012) 49 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 301.
55
Jones, supra, note 23, at para. 43.
52
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exploratory search is conducted to find evidence of other crimes.56 Section
489 of the Criminal Code provides the police with a similar seizure power.57
Justice Blair applied the plain view doctrine to the facts of Jones and
held that it permitted the officer to seize the images of child pornography
that he initially encountered in his search of the computer for evidence of
fraud. These images were inadvertently discovered in the course of a
lawful search that was focused on the objective of the warrant. The plain
view doctrine did not, however, allow the officer to then conduct a further
exploratory search of the computer for evidence of child pornography.58
This latter search was not inadvertent because the officer intentionally
strayed from the objective of the warrant and embarked on a separate,
unauthorized investigation. In this way, Blair J.A. reconciled the elements
of the plain view doctrine with the objective-based approach to assessing
reasonableness.
Jones made a useful contribution to the development of manner of
search law in the computer context by setting out some general contours of
reasonableness. In rejecting the Crown’s “indivisible object” argument,
Jones avoided an approach that would inevitably have led to a dramatic
over-seizure in nearly every computer search case. In adopting an
objective-based approach, Jones provided a framework within which the
police can operate when conducting computer searches and a focal point
for the courts when adjudicating the reasonableness of such searches.
It is important to note that while Jones rejects a methodologybased approach to determining reasonableness, the methodologies
used by the police remain relevant insofar as they shed light on the
subjective intent of the police in conducting the search. Three lower
court decisions — each of which held that the manner of search was
unreasonable — illustrate this point.
56
Id., at para. 56. See also R. v. Spindloe, [2001] S.J. No. 266, 154 C.C.C. (3d) 8, at 29-37
(Sask. C.A.); R. v. F. (L.), [2002] O.J. No. 2604, at paras. 28-34 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Law, [2002] S.C.J.
No. 10, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 227, at para. 27 (S.C.C.).
57
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. While some have suggested that section 489 is simply a
codification of the plain view doctrine, the prevailing view in Ontario is that it is not: see Jones,
id., at para. 58; R. v. B. (E.), [2011] O.J. No. 1042, at paras. 75-78 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal
refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 455 (S.C.C.); R. v. F. (L.), id., at para. 22. The key difference appears
to be that the plain view exception requires the incriminating nature of the item seized to be
“immediately apparent”, while s. 489 requires only that the police have reasonable grounds to
believe that the item will afford evidence of an offence. In R. v. MacNeil, [2014] B.C.J. No. 740,
at para. 97 (B.C.S.C.), however, the Court articulated an important limitation on the s. 489 seizure
power: it cannot be used to authorize the seizure of items deliberately excluded by the search
warrant. See also s. 11(6) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19.
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Jones, id., at paras. 65-70.
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In Beitel, the police claimed that they were conducting a stolen
property investigation and searched the computer to determine its true
ownership.59 The investigating officer, however, testified that the first
place he looked for ownership information was the recycling bin, where
he restricted his search to picture files.60 Further, the officer did not
examine the serial number of the computer or conduct any other
independent inquiries to ascertain ownership. Based on this evidence, the
Court concluded that the officer “proceeded in the manner he did in order
to see if the computer contained child pornography, not to determine
lawful ownership of the computer”.61 The officer’s methods were telling
of his objective. The search was thus held to be unreasonable.
In R. v. Perkins, the police obtained a warrant to search a computer
for “system files and logs” and “internet activity” in order to obtain
evidence in relation to the offence of theft of telecommunications.62 In
executing the warrant, however, the reviewing officer began his search in
the “lost files in the unallocated space, even though he knew that an
easier source to find date and time of internet activity would be in the
allocated space”. (The unallocated space of a computer is where files are
sent after the user has deleted them, but before the computer requires that
space to store additional data.) Further, the reviewing officer did not
“change the default settings of EnCase [i.e., the forensic software he used
to conduct the search] when he began his search, even though it is
possible to a certain extent to limit the data scope and document scope of
EnCase”. The reviewing officer was “aware of tools such as a filter
which allows for customized searches and a lock box which prevents
graphic images from popping up”, but he did not use these tools. Instead,
he followed the same procedure as that which he typically used to search
for child pornography. Again, the officer’s methods were telling of his
objective. The search was thus held to be unreasonable.63
In R. v. Boudreau-Fontaine, the police obtained a warrant to search
the accused’s computer for evidence proving that he had accessed the
Internet, which he was prohibited from doing by probation order.64 In the
course of the computer search, the police discovered images of child
pornography. The Quebec Court of Appeal held that the manner of search
59
60
61
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64
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was unreasonable: “the prosecution offered no evidence that would
indicate whether the agents were still executing the warrant when they
discovered the pornographic materials, that is, that they were still
searching for information demonstrating that the computer had been
connected to the Internet”.65 Implicit in this statement is the assumption
that a police officer searching a computer for evidence of Internet access
would be able to find such evidence long before stumbling upon images
of child pornography.
These cases demonstrate that while the ultimate question in an
objective-based approach concerns the subjective intent of the police,
this intent can be inferred from the search methodology used by the
police. More specifically, these cases suggest that the courts may
effectively require the police to follow an “obvious to obscure” approach.
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit put it in United States
v. Burgess, the officer must “first look in the most obvious places and as
it becomes necessary to progressively move from the obvious to the
obscure”.66 Failing to take such an approach may trigger an adverse
inference that the police were in fact searching for evidence which falls
outside the parameters of the warrant, i.e., evidence of another crime.
Aside from articulating an objective-based approach to assessing
reasonableness, Jones also contains some less helpful dicta about the
permissible scope of computer searches. The most problematic dictum is
the suggestion that the police may have to “examine any file or folder on
the computer to reasonably accomplish [the] authorized search”.67 This
statement was premised on the notion that electronic evidence may be
“concealed” or “cleverly camouflaged” such that the only way to
determine the true nature of files is to open and examine them, “at least
65

Id., at para. 53.
576 F.3d 1078, at 1094 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2009); Schuck, supra, note 48, at 779. The most
recent example of the “obvious to obscure” approach can be found in R. v. Sop, [2014] O.J.
No. 3666, 2014 ONSC 4610 (Ont. S.C.J.), which was released after this paper was submitted for
publication. In that case, the police obtained a warrant on the basis of information that the accused
had downloaded child pornography from a website, AZOV, between November 15 and December 15,
2010. But rather than beginning their search by looking for computer files with the word “AZOV” or
computer files that were downloaded between November 15 and December 15, 2010, the police
began their search by using EnCase to provide a gallery view of all of the images and videos on the
device. They then engaged in “a systematic file by file search” (para. 149). The Court held that this
was unreasonable. At para. 145, it wrote: “It is mildly troubling that the police would not have tried
to search the computers using the two dates in question, the website, the hash values which were
known and the Internet browser history or other techniques before doing what has been described as
a very invasive general search.”
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in a cursory fashion”.68 The police have made this assertion in a number
of cases; it is inaccurate, but has frequently gone unchallenged.69
The police have the means to determine the true nature of files
without opening and examining them. In R. v. Sonne, for instance, the
evidence showed that the forensic software used by the police (i.e.,
EnCase) was capable of determining whether the file type had been
altered.70 The same was true in Ontario (Ministry of the Attorney
General) v. Law Society of Upper Canada.71
Indeed, many commentators have written about the ability of the
police to conduct computer searches without opening files by searching
based on “file headers” or “hash values”. A “file header” is an internal
computer file identifier that tells the computer about the file. Even if
someone tries to disguise an image file by giving it a name and
extension that makes it look like a word processing document, for
example, the computer and forensic software will not be fooled because
the file header will reveal the true nature of the file. 72 A “hash value” is
a 32-character string of numbers and letters that serves as the “digital
finger print” for the file. When the hash values of two files are the same,
there is a sufficiently high statistical improbability of such a result
occurring randomly that the two digital files are likely to be identical.
The relationship between a hash value and its data set compares roughly
to the relationship between an organism and its DNA sequence or
fingerprint.73
Hash values are especially useful for the police when searching for
images of child pornography. The police maintain an extensive database
of the hash values of digital files previously deemed child pornography;
and the police have access to similar databases maintained by other
police forces, including those outside Canada. Thus, the police are able
68
69
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to search a computer for images of child pornography simply by
searching the hash values of files in a computer and looking for matches
with those in its databases.74 They do not have to open each and every
image file in the computer and can therefore avoid inadvertent exposure to
all manner of private information such as intimate family photographs.75
As one judge has said, new technologies may “give rise to new exigencies”,
but they also give rise to “new capabilities”.76
This is not to say that searching by way of file headers and hash tags
is foolproof — or that the police should always be limited to these
forensic tools.77 It is simply to suggest that the courts should be cautious
about accepting the categorical claims of law enforcement that it will
always be necessary to examine every file in the computer because the
true nature of files may be concealed. Such claims are inaccurate because
the police will often, although not always, have the technological tools to
defeat such attempts at concealment. Moreover, such claims may be
baseless where the target of the search is an innocent third party as
opposed to a suspect. Even if such parties are able to conceal files, there
is no reason to think that they will.78
If the police are always allowed to examine every file on a computer
to determine its relevance, informational privacy will be obliterated. In
Little, for example, the reviewing officer examined 13,000 files on the
accused’s computer to determine whether each of these files fell within
the parameters of the warrant.79 On most personal computers, this would
include e-mails, Internet browsing history, instant messages, contacts,
calendar appointments, photographs, videos, music audio files, and
business, financial and medical records. The vast majority of these files
would fall outside the parameters of the warrant; thus, the police would
have had no grounds to review this information. To allow the police to

74
R. v. Braudy, id., at para. 23; R. v. Lamb, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2701, at para. 17 (B.C.S.C.);
R. v. P. (O.), [2012] O.J. No. 2931, at para. 11 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Dominaux, [2014] N.J. No. 16, at para. 9
(N.L. S.C.T.D.); R. v. Johannson, [2008] S.J. No. 827, at para. 6 (Sask. Q.B.); R. v. Trapp, [2011] S.J.
No. 728, at para. 77 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Smith, [2011] B.C.J. No. 437, at para. 34 (B.C.S.C.).
75
See, e.g., Cole, supra, note 9, at para. 88.
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United States of America v. Orphanou, [2004] O.J. No. 622, at para. 62 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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hidden in another type of file (as opposed to the true nature of the file being altered). For instance, an
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access all of this information is to permit the police to sidestep the
protections of section 8 of the Charter. This outcome is constitutionally
intolerable.
In an attempt to offset the invasive nature of this search, the Court in
Little added that while the officer’s approach would be reasonable only if
each file was “looked at cursorily to determine whether it [falls] within
the parameters of the warrant”; in other words, the reviewing officer
must immediately close any file that falls outside of these parameters.80
There are at least three problems, however, with reliance on the cursory
search standard to protect informational privacy.
First, as one commentator has noted, “if officers are allowed to
cursorily examine the contents of each file in order to determine if a
given document is within the scope of the warrant, an individual’s
protection depends upon police officers policing themselves”.81
Second, even if one assumes that the police will always make a
conscientious, good faith attempt to review each file no longer than
absolutely necessary, the “cursory” search standard is unacceptably
vague. The case law has, to date, been unable to provide any meaningful
guidance as to where the line between cursory and non-cursory should be
drawn. (In Sonne, for instance, all the Court could say is that the standard
was met where the reviewing officer “flipped through” the files on the
computer.82) And, this standard may well be eliminated when the
Supreme Court of Canada considers it in the different context of
searching a cell phone incident to arrest in Fearon.83 Both the appellant
and the respondent in Fearon have argued against the cursory search
standard, calling it “impractical”84 and “incapable of precise definition or
consistent application”.85
Third, the cursory search standard becomes meaningless if the plain
view doctrine is applied in the computer search context as the Court of
Appeal contemplated in R. v. Jones. If the police are entitled to review
every single file — even if only cursorily — to determine whether it falls
within the parameters of the warrant, then every such file will fall into
80

Id., at para. 166.
Schuck, supra, note, 48, at 778.
82
Sonne, supra, note 70, at para. 67.
83
Supra, note 5. This case was heard on May 23, 2014 and is currently under reserve.
84
Appellant’s Factum, para. 40 in Fearon, id., available online: <http://www.scccsc.gc.ca/factums-memoires/35298/FM010_Appellant_Kevin-Fearon.pdf>.
85
Respondent’s Factum, para. 96 in Fearon, id., available online: <http://www.scccsc.gc.ca/factums-memoires/35298/FM020_Respondent_Attorney-General-for-Ontario.pdf>.
81

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

COMPUTER SEARCHES AND SEARCH PROTOCOLS

451

“plain view” and be subject to seizure.86 In other words, the police will
always be in a lawful position from which to view (and seize) evidence
of unrelated crimes and the warrant’s scope would thus become
meaningless.87
Accordingly, the courts should examine the facts of each case with
great care — hopefully with the assistance of expert evidence and careful
cross-examinations — to determine whether and when the police can
legitimately claim that the danger of concealed files justifies the
examination of every file on the computer. Such an approach should be
the exception and not the rule. Just as the police cannot resort to the
drastic measure of “dynamic entry” (i.e., entering a residence with a
battering ram) absent evidence of a possibility of violence,88 the police
should not be able to resort to the drastic measure of reviewing every file
on a computer absent evidence of a file concealment that cannot
otherwise be defeated.89 Where the technological tools exist to allow the
police to conduct a more surgical and less invasive search, they should be
required to use them.
3. Search Protocols: When Will They Be Imposed?
The foregoing discussion is premised on the statement in Vu that
manner of search is generally reviewed after the fact.90 The Court did,
however, hold out the possibility that issuing justices may find it
“necessary and practical” to impose search protocols (i.e., ex ante
conditions) for computer searches in certain cases.91 The Court also made
it clear that it was not “foreclos[ing] the possibility that our developing
understanding of computer searches and changes in technology may

86
Jones, supra, note 23, at para. 62. See also Robinton, supra, note 41, at 330; RayMing
Chang, “Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply to Digital Evidence” (2007) 12 Suffolk J.
Trial & App. Advoc. 31, at 43-44; Kerr, supra, note 23, at 304-305; Samantha Trepel, “Digital
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Robinton, supra, note 41, at 333. Many commentators have argued in favour of
abolishing the plain view doctrine in the computer search context: see Kerr, id., at 582-85; Chang,
id., at 59-61.
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make it appropriate to impose search protocols in a broader range of
cases in the future”.92
In what sorts of cases can we expect to see search protocols
imposed? And, how will they look when they are imposed? The Court
gave two examples in Vu: cases involving “confidential intellectual
property or potentially privileged information”. 93 The latter provides a
helpful starting point for an analysis of how search protocols should be
designed.
Search protocols already exist for cases involving potentially
privileged information — both for physical world searches and computer
searches. In Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General),94
the Supreme Court of Canada set out a number of rules to govern the
legality of searches of law offices. These include:
(1) Before searching a law office, the investigative authorities must
satisfy the issuing justice that there exists no other reasonable
alternative to the search.
(2) Except when the warrant specifically authorizes the immediate
examination, copying and seizure of an identified document, all
documents in possession of a lawyer must be sealed before being
examined or removed from the lawyer’s possession.
(3) Every effort must be made to contact the lawyer and the client at the
time of the execution of the search warrant.
(4) Where the lawyer or the client cannot be contacted, a representative of
the Bar should be allowed to oversee the sealing and seizure of
documents.
(5) If notification of potential privilege holders is not possible, the
lawyer who had custody of the documents seized, or another lawyer
appointed either by the Law Society or by the court, should
examine the documents to determine whether a claim of privilege
should be asserted, and should be given a reasonable opportunity
to do so.95
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Following Lavallee, the Law Society of Upper Canada adopted a
set of guidelines for lawyers to follow when their offices become the
targets of search warrants.96 These guidelines were recently
implemented in the computer search context in Law Society of Upper
Canada.97 In that case, the police executed a search warrant for child
pornography in an investigation against a criminal defence lawyer in
Timmins, Ontario.98 The Crown, the Law Society and the accused
agreed on the following search protocol to protect solicitor-client
privilege:
(1) An Examiner (i.e., a forensic computer specialist) was to be appointed
to conduct forensic procedures on the seized devices to enable the
police and the Crown to obtain relevant evidence (the non-privileged
graphic images of alleged child pornography).
(2) A Referee, a lawyer whose role is to assist the Court in ensuring that
the procedure followed for searching the seized devices maximally
protects solicitor-client privilege, was to be appointed.
(3) The Examiner was to create an EnCase forensic image of the
physical drive from each original computer.
(4) The Examiner was to conduct further forensic searching of the
EnCase images instead of working directly with the contents of the
actual seized devices in order to preserve the integrity of the contents
of the seized devices.
(5) The forensic investigation was to take place with the use of certain
programs which “tease out” child pornography without the need to
view privileged files: e.g., the Examiner was to extract all digital
files from each EnCase forensic image using C4P and C4M. The
offensive material would be stored in an external storage device to be
sealed pending a Crown application to unseal.
(6) The Examiner, with the assistance of the Referee, was to determine
whether there were any privileged client files on the EnCase forensic
images. If such privileged files were located, the Examiner was to
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determine that no offensive materials were commingled among the
privileged files and to copy the privileged files to a separate external
storage device.
(7) The Examiner was to file with the Court a report chronicling his work.99
Among other things, this protocol is notable for the interposition of a
neutral and detached third party between the investigating officers and
the target of the warrant. Search protocols aimed at limiting search
methodologies (e.g., restricting the police to certain file types or
keywords) have been criticized on the basis that a search “can be as
much art as a science”100 and that issuing justices “cannot get a sense of
the exigencies that will unfold at each stage of the search process”. 101
None of this criticism, however, impugns the interposition of a neutral
and detached third party. The investigating officers can communicate the
objectives of the warrant to the third party and then defer to the third
party’s judgment as to how best to pursue these objectives. So long as the
third party has the necessary technical expertise, there will be no
detriment to the investigation. There will, however, be an important
advantage for informational privacy. Neutral and detached third parties
are more likely to exercise restraint because they are not “engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”.102 They are less
likely to overlook important forensic tools that allow them to conduct
less invasive and more surgical searches, and they have less incentive to
engage in general exploratory searches of the computer’s contents for
evidence falling outside the parameters of the warrant.103
One expects that law enforcement will resist any requirement for a
neutral and detached third party because it narrows their investigative
discretion and can be costly. For the same reasons, the courts are unlikely
to find that such an approach is constitutionally required in every
computer search case. One can make a compelling argument, however,
that this sort of search protocol should be required in an exceptional
99
100
101
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group of computer search cases in which privacy risks are heightened —
whether because of the quantity or quality of information stored on the
computers, or the extent of commingling between the incriminating
evidence that the police expect to find and innocent but highly personal
information that the police have no right to see. In addition to cases
involving potentially privileged information, three categories of cases
come to mind.
First, a neutral and detached third party may be required for searches
involving confidential intellectual property. In Vu, the Supreme Court
emphasized this as one category of information (along with potentially
privileged information) that might require ex ante conditions to limit the
scope of a computer search before it occurs.104 Lower courts should build
on this statement as the law develops.
Second, a neutral and detached third party may be required for
searches involving networks of computers. As the Supreme Court noted
in Vu, computers are rarely stand-alone, self-contained entities. They are
often connected to networks or servers which link them to other
computers.105 The problem of intermingling and the consequential risk of
over-seizure are exacerbated in this context.106 In large companies, for
instance, thousands of computers are connected to each other across
cities, countries and continents via company network servers. These
computer users share disk drives. If the police are allowed to search these
networks without the oversight of a neutral third party, they could
potentially comb through the private information of thousands of
innocent people before they discover any evidence falling within the
parameters of their warrant.
Consider the facts of United States of America v. Equinix Inc.107 The
United States was investigating Megaupload (a company that ran online
file storage and viewing services) for criminal infringement of copyright,
conspiracy to infringe copyright, money laundering and racketeering. To
assist the United States with its investigation, the Attorney General of
Canada seized 32 computer servers from Megaupload’s Canadian office
and applied for an order under section 15 of the Mutual Legal Assistance
in Criminal Matters Act108 to send mirror-imaged copies of all 32 servers
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to the United States. The volume of data on these servers was the
equivalent of that contained on 100 laptop computers. The Court found
that “it is likely that the volume and breadth of data relevant to the
prosecution as a whole is enormous”.109 Nevertheless, the Court declined
to order all 32 servers to be sent to the United States; instead, it held that
a more refined order was needed. The Court left it to the parties to decide
how the scope of relevant material should be defined, subject to the
matter being brought back to the Court if the parties could not agree.110
The interposition of the Court in the process of identifying the
information that the state should be allowed to review is analogous to a
requirement for a neutral and detached third party to oversee the
execution of a search warrant.
Third, a neutral and detached third party may be required for
searches aimed at innocent parties.111 Search warrants are not always
obtained to search the computers of a suspect; they can also be obtained
to search the computers of innocent parties, so long as there are
reasonable grounds to believe that such computers contain evidence of
crime. The best example of this may be United States v. Comprehensive
Drug Testing.112 There, the U.S. government conducted an investigation
into the use of steroids by professional baseball players. The
government obtained warrants to seize the drug-testing records of 10
named players from Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc. (“CDT”), a
private company that administered anonymous drug testing services. In
executing the warrant, however, the government seized the computers
of the CDT and ended up reviewing the drug testing records of
hundreds of players and many other people who had no connection to
the investigation.113 The state would not have been exposed to this
highly personal information had the search been conducted by a neutral
and detached third party.
The above examples focus on exceptional situations in which the
privacy interests are even greater than they are in the ordinary
computer search case — and, therefore, where the need for search
protocols is enhanced. This, however, should not be taken to suggest
that similar protocols should never be required when the police target
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their search at a single computer. Indeed, there may be good reason to
insist that such searches should always be conducted by an officer
with special training in computer forensics and who is otherwise
uninvolved in the investigation. Such an officer would not be a
neutral and detached third party in the sense of being outside law
enforcement, but he or she would at least be one step removed from
the investigation. This procedure was followed in R. v. Blazevic, and
it was upheld as reasonable under section 8 of the Charter on ex post
review.114

III. CONCLUSION
The law of computer search and seizure is still in its infancy. The
Supreme Court of Canada has answered some basic questions in Morelli
(computer searches are invasive), Cole (warrants are required to search
both personal and work computers) and Vu (warrants must specifically
authorize a computer search). These decisions address the first
prophylactic rule under section 8 of the Charter (i.e., the requirement of
prior authorization) in the computer search context. Now it is time to
address the second rule that the manner of search must be reasonable —
and this is where the hard work begins.
Developing manner of search law is challenging in the computer
context because computer searches are driven by technology, which is
constantly evolving. Thus, the imposition of overly specific rules
enhances the risk of error. Such rules can unfairly limit the ability
of the police to discover evidence that they have been authorized
to seize, on the one hand, or overlook the ability of the police to
conduct surgical searches that minimize the invasion of privacy, on the
other hand.
This paper has attempted to focus on the general principles that can
be extrapolated from the emerging case law and that can point the way
forward while retaining the necessary flexibility to adapt to technological
advances. These include the following propositions:
(1) The courts should carefully examine the methodology used by the
police to determine whether they were faithful to the objectives of
the warrant in their execution of the search.
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(2) The courts should resist categorical claims that every file on a computer
must be examined, even if only cursorily, to determine its relevance.
(3) The courts should require search protocols to be set out in the warrant
in certain cases involving heightened privacy risks (e.g., searches
involving potentially privileged information and confidential intellectual
property; searches aimed at networks of computers; and searches
targeting innocent parties).
A proper balance between the interests of law enforcement and the
privacy rights of individuals is critical in a free and democratic society.
In the foreseeable future, this tension will manifest itself most
significantly in computer searches. The Supreme Court of Canada has
taken important steps to shore up the requirement of prior authorization
in this context. The most important work, however, remains to be done.
The courts must continue to focus on the many unique features of
computers outlined in Vu as they develop new rules to regulate the
manner of computer searches. Only this will ensure the continuing
relevance of section 8 of the Charter in the digital age.

